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PUBLICATION ETHICS AND PUBLICATION MALPRACTICE
STATEMENT
ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR JOURNAL PUBLICATION
The publication of the peer-reviewed journal Annual Survey of
South African Law contributes to the growth of knowledge.
Therefore, all participants — authors, editors, peer reviewers,
and the publisher — agree on standards of proper ethical
behaviour. The University of South Africa and Juta and Co Ltd,
who are respectively responsible for producing and publishing
the journal, recognise the ethical and other responsibilities and
take our guardianship of the functions connected with the publi-
cation of the journal very seriously.
DUTIES OF AUTHORS
The authors undertake to present an accurate and current
account of legislative and judicial developments and to provide
objective discussion. The material must contain sufficient detail
and permit others to replicate the work. Making fraudulent or
knowingly inaccurate statements is unacceptable. Work reflect-
ing editorial opinion must be acknowledged as such.
The work must be original, and where the work/words of others
have been used this must be appropriately quoted or cited.
Plagiarism in any form is unethical behaviour, and unacceptable.
Authors are not permitted, in general, to publish manuscripts
conveying the same research in more than one journal. Submit-
ting the same manuscript to more than one journal for publication
is unethical and unacceptable, save in exceptional circum-
stances where the authors have sought approval from the editor
for publication of the same material in a secondary publication, in
which case the primary reference must be cited in the secondary
publication.
If an author discovers that his or her published work contains
an inaccuracy, he or she must promptly notify the editor, and
cooperate with the editor to excise or correct the content. If the
editor is informed of an inaccuracy by a third party, the author
must promptly retract or correct the manuscript, or prove that the
original content is correct.
DUTIES OF EDITORS
The editors of the Annual Survey of South African Law are
responsible for deciding whether chapters submitted for publica-
vii
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 15 PAGE: 8 SESS: 371 OUTPUT: Tue Jun 6 13:03:57 2017
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey15/00−prelims
tion should be accepted. They may be guided by policies of the
editorial board. The editor-in-chief may confer with the other
editors in making a final determination.
The editors must ensure that contributions to the journal appear
in correct English which complies with the style-guidelines pre-
scribed for the journal. The editors evaluate the intellectual
content of manuscripts without regard to gender, race, religious
belief, sexual orientation, citizenship, ethnic origin or the political
inclinations of the authors.
The editorial board will not disclose any information about
chapters submitted for publication to anyone other than the
corresponding author, reviewers, and the publisher as appro-
priate.
Unpublished material submitted by authors may not be used in
the editor’s own research without consent from the author. Editors
must disclose competing interests and publish corrections if the
conflicts of interest are discovered after publication. If required,
other action must be taken, such as retraction of the manuscript
and expression of concern.
The editors take responsibility to respond to ethical complaints
concerning a submitted manuscript or chapter published in the
Annual Survey of South African Law. Any reported complaint,
even if submitted years after publication, will be investigated and
appropriate measures will be taken.
DUTIES OF REVIEWERS
The objective peer review process assists the editor in chief in
making editorial decisions, and in improving the quality of the
chapters. Peer review is a key component of scholarly communi-
cation and ensures sound standards of research and proper
acknowledgment of sources used.
Unpublished materials contained in an unpublished manu-
script may not be used in the reviewer’s own research without the
consent of the author. Reviewers must disclose any possible
conflict of interests that may exist, and recuse themselves from
reviews in instances where such a conflict exists.
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SENTENCING
ANDRA LE ROUX-KEMP*
LEGISLATION
See the discussion under the chapter Criminal Procedure.
CASE LAW
Convictions and sentences on counts of multiple rape
The conviction of the two appellants in Cock v S, Manuel v S
[2015] 2 All SA 178 (ECG) (3 February 2015) arose out of a single
incident in that they acted in the furtherance or execution of a
common purpose to rape the complainant (para [2]).
The first appellant was apprehended during 2012 and pleaded
guilty and was convicted of robbery with aggravating circum-
stances as well as rape. In respect of the robbery charge, the first
appellant was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment as sub-
stantial and compelling circumstances were found to warrant a
deviation from the prescribed minimum sentence of fifteen years’
imprisonment in terms of section 51(2) of the Criminal Law
Amendment Act 105 of 1997 (paras [3]-[5]). The appellant was
also sentenced to the prescribed minimum sentence of life
imprisonment in terms of section 51(1) of the same Act based on
the allegation that the complainant was raped by more than one
person acting in the execution or furtherance of a common
purpose and/or grievous bodily harm was inflicted on her during
the rape (para [4]). The second appellant was apprehended after
the conviction and sentence of the first appellant had been
finalised and was also charged with robbery with aggravating
circumstances and rape. The second appellant also pleaded
guilty to both counts and was convicted and sentenced to five
years’ imprisonment on the first count, and to the prescribed
minimum sentence of life imprisonment on the second count
(paras [6] [7]).
On appeal, Judge Pickering of the Eastern Cape High Court,
Grahamstown, found that no admissible evidence had been
*BA LLB (Stell), CML (UNISA), LLD (Stell), BMus (UNISA) Hons BMus
(UNISA). Assistant Professor at the School of Law, City University of Hong Kong;
Visiting Research Scholar at the School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand.
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placed before the sentencing court to the effect that a knife had
been placed or pressed against the complainant’s neck during
the course of the rape, or that grievous bodily harm had otherwise
been inflicted upon her (para [13]). And, with regard to whether
the prescribed minimum sentence of life imprisonment was
applicable on the rape charge on the basis that the complainant
was raped by more than one person acting in the execution or
furtherance of a common purpose, it was held that the prescribed
minimum sentence of life imprisonment in terms of section 51(1)
of the Act would still apply despite the fact that at the time of the
first appellant’s trial, his co-perpetrator had yet to be appre-
hended and convicted (para [15]).
However, the appeal court in this instance was bound by a
decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Mahlase v S (255/13)
[2013] ZASCA 191 (29 November 2013), where it was held that
since the co-perpetrators of a gang rape in that case were not
before the trial court and had not yet been convicted of the rape,
the accused in that matter could not be sentenced in terms of the
provisions of Part 1 of Schedule 2 of the Criminal Law Amend-
ment Act 105 of 1997 (para [21]). With regard to this finding,
Judge Pickering stated that he had ‘with the greatest respect,
considerable difficulty in understanding the basis upon which the
conclusion was reached’ (para [23]). He held that once the
evidence of a complainant is accepted, and her evidence
establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that she was indeed
raped more than once by more than one person, one of whom is
the accused before the court, then the fact that the co-perpetrators
are yet to be apprehended and/or convicted of the rape, is entirely
irrelevant (para [25]). Judge Pickering further stated that ‘[a] trial
court is obliged to sentence an accused who appears before it on
the basis of the facts which it found to have been proven when
convicting the accused’ (para [26]). Judge Pickering also rejected
the submission that the Mahlase case is distinguishable from the
Cock and Manual case as the first appellant had pleaded guilty to
gang rape. In this regard, Judge Pickering stated that there is in
principle no difference between a case where the conviction of the
accused is based on credible evidence tendered by the state or
based on a plea of guilty by the accused (para [29]).
However, being bound by the decision of the Supreme Court of
Appeal in Mahlase, the first appellant’s sentence of life imprison-
ment on the count of rape in the present case was set aside and
considered afresh (para [31]). Not finding any substantial or
350 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2015)
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compelling circumstances warranting a deviation from the pre-
scribed minimum sentence, and with due regard to the particular
aggravating circumstances present in this case, Judge Pickering
sentenced the first appellant to a term of life imprisonment on the
rape count (para [36]). For the second appellant, the prescribed
minimum sentence of life imprisonment was applicable as his
accomplice, the first appellant, had already been convicted and
sentenced for raping the complainant (para [38]). A term of life
imprisonment for the rape count was subsequently also con-
firmed and imposed on the second appellant (paras [42]-[45]).
In another case, Maxabaniso v S 2015 (2) SACR 553 (ECG)
(5 May 2015), Judge Plasket of the Eastern Cape High Court,
Grahamstown, had to decide whether an accused, who had
penetrated the complainant twice, should be charged with one or
two counts of rape. The appellant in this case was convicted of
contravening section 3 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and
Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 and was sentenced
to fifteen years’ imprisonment (para [1]). The appellant had
sexual intercourse with the complainant against her will and
penetrated her twice during the same encounter and within a
relatively short period of time (paras [2]). While the charge sheet
only made mention of one count of rape, reference was also
made to sections 51 and 52 as well as Schedule 2 of the Criminal
Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 which refers to the particular
circumstances in which specific minimum sentences apply (para
[12]). When the charge was put to the appellant, the prosecutor
added that ‘. . .this offence is read with the provisions of section
51 and/or 52 and Schedule 2 of the Criminal LawAmendment Act
105 of 1997 as amended meaning that should a conviction follow
in this matter that the State would ask the court to consider life
imprisonment in this matter due to the fact that the complainant
was raped more than once’ (para [13]).
In S v Kimberley & another 2005 (2) SACR 663 (SCA), Judge
Zulman stated that the mischief which the legislature sought to
deal with in Part I of Schedule 2 of the Criminal Law Amendment
Act 105 of 1997 read with section 51 (1), ‘was the situation where
a woman is subjected to multiple rapes either by one person or
by any ‘‘co-perpetrator or accomplice’’. [And] [p]aragaph (a)(i) of
Schedule 2 covers the situation where ‘‘the victim was raped
more than once’’ ’ (para [9] of the Kimberley case as quoted in
para [19] in the case under discussion). For example, in S v M
2007 (2) SACR 60 (W) and S v Senyolo 2010 (2) SAR 571 (GSJ),
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the accused raped the same victim once on two different
occasions a few months apart and the accused in both these
cases were charged with and convicted on two counts of rape.
The courts in both cases also held that the prescribed minimum
sentence of life imprisonment applied because the accused had
raped the same victim more than once (para [21]).
However, Judge Plasket of the Eastern Cape High Court,
Grahamstown, distinguished the Maxabaniso case from that of
S v M and S v Senyolo as the two acts of rape in the Maxabaniso
case were not separated by a significant period of time but rather
constituted two separate acts of penetration during the course of
the same incident (paras [22] [23]; also see S v Nkomo 2007 (2)
SACR 198 (SCA) and S v Willemse 2011 (2) SACR 531 (ECG)).
Judge Plasket subsequently submitted that ‘the legislature envis-
aged an accused being charged with one charge of rape if, in the
course of his encounter with his victim, he penetrates her more
than once’ (para [25]). And in this (Maxabaniso) case, the two
acts of penetration occurred during the course of a single
encounter between the appellant and the complainant and the
one count of rape was therefore correct (para [26]).
Also see Makeleni v S (CA & R 411/2014 [2015] ZAECGHC 49
(13 May 2015); Seitshiro v S (A167/2014) [2015] ZAFSHC 31
(12 February 2015); and S v Madisha (CC161/2015) [2015]
ZAGPPHC 1142 (3 December 2015).
DISPROPORTIONALITY BETWEEN SENTENCES IMPOSED ON AN ACCUSED
AND HIS OR HER CO-ACCUSED
An appellate tribunal may interfere with a sentence on the
ground that the sentence imposed is disturbingly inappropriate
when compared to the sentence imposed upon a co-accused.
However, the limits of an appellate tribunal’s powers in this regard
were also recognised in S v Marx 1989 (1) SA 222 (A) 225B–226B
where it was emphasised that uniformity in sentences amongst
co-accused should not be elevated to a principle. Only where
‘there is a disturbing disparity in such sentences, and the
degrees of participation are more or less equal, and there are not
personal factors warranting such disparity, appellate interference
with the sentence may, depending on the circumstances, be
warranted. [Moreover in] . . . ameliorating the offending sentence
on appeal, the Court does not necessarily equate the sentence: it
does what it considers appropriate in the circumstances’ (also
see S v Giannoulis 1975 (4) SA 867 (A)).
352 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2015)
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This was again confirmed in Terblanche v S (CA&R 197/2012)
[2015] ZAECGHC 13 (5 March 2015), where the appellant was
sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment following his conviction on
a charge of fraud (para [1]). The appellant was one of six
accused arraigned on a main charge of fraud and several other
counts (para [3]). At the conclusion of the trial, the fifth accused
was acquitted on all charges while the remainder of the accused
were all convicted of fraud as referred to in paragraphs (a) and
(b) of Schedule II of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of
1997, and sentenced to various terms ranging from twelve years
to three years’ imprisonment and subject to periods of suspen-
sion on certain conditions for some of the remaining accused
(para [4]). The appellant predicated that his sentence was
shockingly inappropriate, regard being had to his limited role in
the commission of the offence, the relatively lighter sentences
imposed on some of the other accused, and the fact that the
appellant did not derive any financial or other benefits from
having participated in the commission of the crime (para [5]).
In considering the reasoning for the sentence imposed by the
trial court, JudgeChetty of theEasternCapeHighCourt,Grahams-
town, indicated that it was apparent from the trial court’s
judgment that the appellant’s involvement in the perpetration of
the fraud was crucial to its success (para [12]). It was held that
‘[t]he parallelism sought to be drawn between the participation of
the appellant and the erstwhile accused . . . in the fraud pro-
ceeds not only from an erroneous understanding of the evidence
adduced, but, more importantly, a total disregard of the trial
court’s factual findings’ (para [16]). Judge Chetty also recog-
nised that the personal circumstances of all the accused were
entirely disparate and that reliance on the alleged disproportion-
ality of the sentences imposed in this matter was entirely mis-
placed and did not establish a proper basis warranting
interference with the original sentence imposed (para [16]).
Also see Maliswane & another v S (59/2015) [2015] ZAECGHC
85 (27 August 2015).
INTERNAL POLICIES AND GUIDELINES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES AS TO THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS ARE
IRRELEVANT FOR THE PURPOSE OF SENTENCING
The appellant in Bevu v S (CA&R 357/2014) [2015] ZAECGHC
11 (3 March 2015) pleaded guilty and was convicted of theft and
sentenced to twelve months’ imprisonment in terms of section
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276(1)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, and to a
further six months’ imprisonment which was conditionally sus-
pended for a period of four years (para [1]). In handing down the
sentence the magistrate categorised the theft as a ‘serious crime’
as he found that the offence had been committed with a measure
of premeditation and that the items were luxury items (para [4]).
However, the magistrate also took into consideration that the
appellant was a young man and a first offender and hence
proceeded to record in his reasoning for the sentence imposed
that the practical effect of the sentence in terms of section
276(1)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 was that the
appellant would effectively serve two months’ imprisonment and
ten months’ correctional supervision (para [7]; also see S v Kulati
1975 (1) SA 557 (E) and S v Karg 1961 (1) SA 231 (A)).
Judge Eksteen of the Eastern Cape High Court, Grahamstown,
found this reasoning for the sentence imposed to be unpersua-
sive as the magistrate failed to provide any basis for his percep-
tion that the appellant would only serve two months’ imprisonment
(para [8]). Furthermore, he held that there is no provision in the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 from which such a conclusion
can be drawn, and even if as a matter of policy or set guidelines
the Commissioner of Correctional Services were to consider the
release of the appellant after two months, such internal policies or
guidelines of the Department of Correctional Services should not
come into play when determining what an appropriate sentence
upon a conviction of theft would be (para [8]). Thus, relying upon
the expectation that an accused would be released from prison
after having served a period of his or her sentence is a misdirec-
tion warranting that a sentence so imposed be set aside and
considered afresh (para [8]).
NOTEWORTHY SPECIFIC SENTENCES
Determining a suitable sentence can be a remarkably complex
aspect of the criminal process. Not only does this part of the
process involve general principles of sentencing as well as
specific statutory prescriptions, but also value judgments and
weighing of sometimes contradictory factors. The punishment
must also be personalised. A number of specific sentences are
discussed below in order to illustrate the dynamic nature of
sentencing.
Drug offences
The appellant in Mandlozi v S 2015 (2) SACR 258 (FB) was
convicted of dealing in more than 25kg of methamphetamine in
354 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2015)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 15 PAGE: 7 SESS: 15 OUTPUT: Tue Jun 6 13:03:57 2017
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey15/ch11
contravention of section 5(b) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking
Act 140 of 1992 and sentenced to eighteen years’ imprisonment
(paras [1] [2]). The appellant appealed against this sentence
submitting that it was shockingly severe given the circumstances
of the case and for this reason inappropriate (para [7]).
In addition to considering the personal circumstances of the
appellant, which were generally favourable, the trial court also
took into account the nature and seriousness of the crime
committed (paras [9] [10]). In this regard, it was also held that
‘[t]he quantity of drugs found in an accused person’s possession
must invariably be considered as a barometer for the moral
blameworthiness of the individual concerned. It follows that,
therefore, the larger the quantity of drugs an offender deals with
or possesses, the heavier the sentence would be’ (para [12]; also
see S v Keyser 2012 (2) SACR 437 (SCA)).
On appeal, Judges Rampai and Mbhele of the Free State High
Court, Bloemfontein, further added that the appellant was ‘not just
a naïve woman who was taken advantage of by a drug lord. She
was not an amateur in drug trafficking. She was a cunning mule’
(para [17]). Yet, the judges also found that the court a quo had
failed to appreciate the significance of the distinction between
the two types of dependence-producing substance that exist:
undesirable substances like ‘crystal meth’ on the one hand, and
more dangerous substances like cocaine on the other (para
[19]). While the lawmaker views trafficking in both these two types
of substance in a serious light, the same punishment will not
apply to couriers found in possession of the same quantity of
drugs, the one being a dangerous substance and the other an
undesirable substance (para [20]). However, it was also empha-
sised that ‘crystal meth’ or ‘tik’ can be manufactured with ease, is
relatively cheap, highly addictive and readily available, and has
dire consequences for the addict (paras [25] [29] [30]). And,
more generally, the ‘negative and devastating repercussions of
drugs on the society in general, and the addicts in particular, are
so notorious that no reasonable person can claim to be ignorant
of them’ (para [28]).
Therefore, given that the prescribed maximum sentence,
according to statute, was 25 years’ imprisonment, Judges Ram-
pai and Mbhele ultimately found a more appropriate sentence to
be a term of eighteen years’ imprisonment, of which four years
are suspended for five years on condition that the appellant is not
again found guilty of contravening section 5(b) of the Drugs and
355SENTENCING
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Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992 committed during the period of
suspension (para [40]).
Environmental offences
The appellant in Lemthongthai v S 2015 (1) SACR 353 (SCA)
was charged with 26 counts of contravening section 80(1)(i) of
the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 in that he traded illegally
in rhino horn, and 24 counts related to contraventions of section
57(1) read with sections 101(1) and 102 of the National Environ-
mental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004 (NEMBA). The
trial court did not regard the appellant’s plea of guilty as a
mitigating factor but rather saw it as a ‘manifestation of the
appellant being realistic’ (para [10]). Other factors that were
taken into account included the seriousness of the offences, the
importance of the preservation of South Africa’s biodiversity, and
the appellant’s manipulation of the permit system in the scheme
of his criminal activities (paras [10] [11]). The appellant was
ultimately sentenced to an effective 40 years’ imprisonment of
which ten years’ imprisonment was imposed for the offences
relating to section 80(1)(i) of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of
1964, and the remainder of the counts were divided arbitrarily
into three groups for the purpose of sentencing, totalling an
effective 30-year term (para [11]).
On appeal against this sentence in the South Gauteng High
Court, Johannesburg, it was reasoned that since the trial court
took the counts in relation to section 80(1)(i) of the Customs and
ExciseAct 91 of 1964 together, the term of imprisonment for these
offences should have been restricted to five years (and not ten
years) as the particular provision of the Act only provides for a
maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment. The High Court
also divided the remainder of the counts into arbitrary groups in
order to arrive at a sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment, a
sentence that it deemed to be both permissible and appropriate
(paras [15] [16]).
Justice Navsa writing for the majority of the Supreme Court of
Appeal agreed that the offences were of so serious a nature that
a custodial sentence was called for, but held that both the trial
court and the High Court had erred in having regard to the
existence of a rhino trading syndicate, of which there was no
evidence, of equating the appellant to a typical poacher, and in
grouping certain of the counts together arbitrarily for the purpose
of sentencing (paras [18]-[21]). Moreover, given that all the rhinos
356 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2015)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 15 PAGE: 9 SESS: 14 OUTPUT: Tue Jun 6 13:03:57 2017
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey15/ch11
were killed during one operation, it was held that a sentence of six
months’ imprisonment on the counts relating to the provisions of
the NEMBA was appropriate and that a fine of R1 million be
imposed for the counts relating to section 80(1)(i) of the Customs
and Excise Act 91 of 1964.
Stock theft
The three appellants in Velebhayi & others v S 2015 (1) SACR 7
(ECG) were convicted on seven counts of stock theft in terms of
the Stock Theft Act 57 of 1959, in that they stole a total of 168
sheep from a number of farms in the Kirkwood district over a
period of some two months (para [1]). The first and second
appellants were each sentenced to an effective term of 23 years’
imprisonment which consisted of three consecutive terms of nine,
nine and five years’ imprisonment (para [2]). This effective term of
23 years’ imprisonment was computed as follows: the first and
second appellants were sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment
in respect of five of the counts, and five years’ imprisonment in
respect of the remaining two counts. Four sentences of the nine
years’ imprisonment and one of five years’ imprisonment were
ordered to run concurrently (para [2]). The third appellant had a
relevant previous conviction and was sentenced to an effective
28 years’ imprisonment consisting of nine-year sentences in
respect of four counts ordered to run concurrently, a further nine
years’ imprisonment, and two sentences of five years’ imprison-
ment all running consecutively (para [2]).
The Stock Theft Act 57 of 1959 offers limited assistance in
terms of prescribing appropriate sentences for offences created
in terms of the Act. Section 14 of the Act merely provides that
neither a district nor a regional court may impose sentences for
stock theft that are in excess of their normal sentencing jurisdic-
tion (para [5]). In this matter, therefore, the court considered
the personal circumstances of each appellant, the interests of
society, and the nature and seriousness of the offences (para [6]).
With regard to the latter, the following factors received special
consideration: it was clear from the evidence that the offences
were well-planned and that the appellants were part of a stock
theft syndicate (paras [10] [11]); and the thefts were also not,
unlike many other stock theft cases, motivated by hunger or
need, rather, ‘. . . the organized nature of the offences, the sheer
scale of the operation and the fact that the appellants were all
employed lead to the inescapable inferences that the motive for
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the offences was greed’ (para [13]). The photographs submitted
as evidence also showed that many of the slaughtered sheep
were pregnant ewes, the farmers therefore had also lost the
progeny of their ewes (para [12]). The scale of the operation and
its brazen nature furthermore led to farmers in the area having to
take extraordinary measures, some with serious financial implica-
tions, in order to protect their stock (para [14]). And while section
15 of the Stock Theft Act 57 of 1959 makes provision for a court
order that offenders compensate complainants for their loss,
‘there was no purpose in making such an order in this case given
the means of the appellants and the quantum of the losses
suffered by the farmers’ (para [15]).
These offence-specific factors also had to be considered in
relation to the interests of society. In this regard, it was held that
while the prevalence of the offence has had the effect that courts,
as a general rule, would imprison first offenders for a period of six
months to a year for the theft of even only one sheep and in the
absence of special circumstances, a tendency is observable in
recent years of courts imposing increasingly harsher sentences
(para [17]). Some of the reasons cited for this tendency include
the difficulty law enforcement officials experience in apprehending
and prosecuting offenders, and the difficulty farmers experience in
trying to protect their stock and prevent this crime (para [18]). The
economic impact of stock theft on rural communities was also
considered an important factor that contributes to the inherent
seriousness of the offence, as it ‘is not only the owners of stock who
suffer but their workers as well, whose continued employment is
placed at risk as farmers either go out of business, reduce or close
down their stock farming operations or change to less labour
intensive farming that does not carry the same risks of stock theft,
such as game farming’ (para [19]). There is furthermore a danger
that people will resort to self-help and vigilantism if ‘sentences do
not properly and fairly reflect societal censure for stock theft and
do not adequately protect the interest of society’ (para [21]).
Yet, in considering relevant case law, Judge Plasket writing for
the majority of the Eastern Cape High Court, Grahamstown, found
that the sentences imposed in this matter were substantially more
severe than comparable sentences from recent years (para [30];
S v Khumalo en andere 1983 (2) SA 540 (N); S v Oosthuizen 1993
(1) SACR 10 (A); S v Oosthuisen en ’n ander 1996 (1) SACR 475
(O); S v Tyers 1997 (1) SACR 261 (NC); S v Molenbeek en andere
1997 (2) SACR 346 (O) and S v Vunati [2003] JOL 11171 (E)).
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Judge Plasket described the approach adopted by the magis-
trate in this case as ‘rough and ready’ in that it was not
well-reasoned, but not irregular (para [35]). The only misdirection
was with regard to the cumulative effect of the sentences
imposed, which was found to be too harsh ‘to the point where it
can be said that they are startlingly inappropriate’ (para [37]). In
this regard, it was held that ‘[t]hese are the sort of sentences that
are imposed to deter serious crimes involving violence — and
then only rarely. They are far out of kilter with the effective
sentences that have been imposed for multiple counts of stock
theft involving large numbers of small stock. They must be
interfered with . . .’ (para [37]).
The appeals against the sentences subsequently succeeded
and the first and second appellants were sentenced to an
effective term of fourteen years’ imprisonment and the third
appellant to an effective term of sixteen years’ imprisonment
(para [40]).
White-collar crime
In an appeal by the state in terms of section 316B of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, Justice Navsa, writing for the
majority of the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v Brown 2015 (1)
SACR 211 (SCA) not only criticised the sentencing court for the
number and nature of interventions during the proceedings
(paras [126]-[145]), but also held that the
sentence imposed by the court tends toward bringing the administra-
tion of justice into disrepute. Less privileged people who were
convicted of theft of items of minimal value have had custodial
sentences imposed. We must guard against creating the impression
that there are two streams of justice; one for the rich and one for the
poor (para [121]).
The accused in this case pleaded guilty and was convicted on
two counts of fraud and sentenced to a fine or R75 000 or
eighteen months’ imprisonment for each of the convictions. A
further eighteen months’ imprisonment on each of the convictions
was imposed but suspended for four years on condition that the
accused is not again convicted of the crime during the period of
suspension (para [92]). In evaluating this sentence Justice Navsa
held that the court had erred in finding that the convictions were
not that serious and that the offender’s moral blameworthiness
was limited (para [116]). It was also held that the court had erred
in holding that section 51(2)(a) of Act 105 of 1997 did not apply
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(para [117]). The sentences were consequently set aside and
substituted with the prescribed minimum sentence of fifteen
years’ imprisonment on each count of fraud. The sentences were
ordered to run concurrently (para [125]).
Compare with S v Grobler 2015 (2) SACR 210 (SCA).
Murder and specific cultural and religious beliefs relating to sangoma
practices
The appellant in Mogaramedi v S 2015 (1) SACR 427 (GP) was
a practising sangoma and as part of his final initiation, he killed a
close family relative and removed her genital organs (para [4]).
He subsequently pleaded guilty to murder and was sentenced to
life imprisonment in terms of section 51(1) of the Criminal Law
Amendment Act 105 of 1997 (para [1]).
Appealing against his sentence the appellant submitted that
the sentencing court had ailed sufficiently to take into account the
role that his practice as a sangoma and his belonging to a
particular cultural community had played in the commission of
the offence (paras [13]-[20]). However, Justice Dosio, writing for
the majority of the North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria, did not
agree that the appellant’s particular cultural and religious beliefs
constituted substantial and compelling circumstances that war-
ranted a deviation from the prescribed minimum sentence. It was
held that section 51(3)(a) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act
specifically excludes a person’s cultural and religious beliefs
from amounting to substantial and compelling circumstances
and it was evident from a review of case law involving offences
related to witchcraft and muti-killings, that an offender’s belief in
witchcraft and practice as a sangoma cannot be regarded as
mitigating factors with regard to sentencing (paras [27]-[31]).
Justice Dosio furthermore held that given the strong cultural
beliefs surrounding traditional healers in South Africa, it was the
task of the court to deter the killing of innocent people for the
purpose of muti. He held that ‘to regard such killings as substan-
tial and compelling circumstances would send out the wrong
message to the community’ (para [35]). The appeal against the
sentence was consequently dismissed (para [38]).
SECTION 280 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF 1977
Sentencing courts are granted a wide discretion to order that
sentences run concurrently or consecutively. The basic guiding
principle is fairness and the appropriateness of the effective
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sentence. A conclusion that the cumulative effect of sentences
will lead to a disproportionately severe sentence will normally be
an indication that sentences should rather be served concur-
rently.
A sentencing court’s discretion to consider the cumulative effect of
sentences imposed
In Mopp v S (CA&R38/2015) [2015] ZAECGHC 136
(25 November 2015), Judge Goosen of the Eastern Cape High
Court, Grahamstown, reasserted the general principle that it is for
the sentencing court to consider the cumulative effect of sen-
tences and to decide whether the sentence it imposes ought to
be served either in whole or in part concurrently with a previously
imposed sentence (para [7]). Likewise, section 280 of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 also provides for the concurrence of
sentences where an accused has been convicted of multiple
offences by the court (paras [6] [8]).
In deciding whether or not to exercise its discretion, a sentencing
court will consider the following factors: the nature of the previously
committed offence and whether it shares elements with the
offence for which the accused is being sentenced; the proximity
in time between the commission of the different offences and the
circumstances of the previous conviction; the overall objects of
the sentence imposed; and the court will seek to achieve a
balance between the competing interests of the accused, the
complainant and the interests of society. Finally, the court will also
‘tinge its sentence with mercy’ (para [9]). An appeal court will
furthermore only interfere with the sentence of the trial court if the
sentence is vitiated by irregularity, a material misdirection, or
where there is a striking disparity between the sentence imposed
and the sentence that the appeal court considers appropriate
(para [10]).
It was evident from the record of the matter under discussion
here that the trial magistrate had indeed exercised his discretion
in this regard, and that this discretion had been reasonably
exercised — the test being whether the sentence imposed,
having regard to the cumulative effect of the two sentences,
induces a sense of shock (paras [17] [18]). Judge Goosen
ultimately held that ‘the appellant is required to serve a period of
twenty-three years’ imprisonment for two separately committed
offences involving violence and in which one of the victims lost
his life’; this, in his view, was not ‘shockingly inappropriate or
disproportionate punishment’ (para [18]).
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Also see S v Mthetwa & others 2015 (1) SACR 302 (GP) and S v
Motloung 2015 (1) SACR 310 (GJ).
Bringing into operation an earlier suspended sentence and ordering for it
to run concurrently with a new or any other sentence
Section 280(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
provides that sentences of imprisonment will generally com-
mence the one after the expiration, setting aside or remission of
the other, in such an order as the court may direct, unless the
court orders that such sentences of imprisonment, or part thereof,
shall run concurrently. Section 297(9)(a) of the Criminal Proce-
dure Act 51 of 1977 further provides for a suspended sentence to
be brought into operation where any condition imposed has not
been complied with. Section 297(9)(a)(ii) specifically requires
that such a suspended sentence be brought into operation by the
court which suspended the operation of the sentence or any
court of equal or superior jurisdiction. An anomaly created by
these two provisions is, therefore, that a court that brings into
operation an earlier suspended sentence in terms of section
280(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 is not empow-
ered to order that the sentence run concurrently with a new or any
other sentence. A ‘trial court’, on the other hand, which convicts
an accused of a subsequent offence which invokes the enforce-
ment of a previously suspended sentence, may order its sen-
tence (the new sentence) to run concurrently with the previously
suspended sentence (para [2.3] of S v Chake (130/2014; 19/860/
10) [2015] ZAFSHC 185 (12 October 2015); also see S v Mawatla
1979 (2) SA839 (O); S v Osborne 1981 (3) SA645 (C); S v Mothibi
1982 (4) SA 49 (NCD); S v Govender 1986 (4) SA 972 (N); S v
Chabalala 1988 (1) SACR 203 (OPD); S v Breytenbach 1988 (4)
SA 486 (T); S v Hoffman 1992 (2) SACR 56 (C); and S v Brand
unreported case no 343/2010 Free State High Court, 29 July
2010).
This anomaly was considered in S v Chake (130/2014; 19/860/
10) [2015] ZAFSHC 185 (12 October 2015)). The accused in this
case was eighteen years of age in 2010 when he was sentenced
to one years’ imprisonment wholly suspended for five years in
terms of section 297(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of
1977. This suspended sentence was brought into operation in
2014 by the District Court: Bloemfontein in terms of section
297(9)(a)(ii), and the presiding officer decided to apply section
280(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 due to the
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special circumstances of the case and to allow for the 2010
sentence imposed to run concurrently with the sentence that
caused the suspended sentence to be put into operation (para
[2.1]). The magistrate submitted her decision to invoke section
280(2) to order concurrency for special review and stated that
‘the narrow interpretation of the ‘‘court’’ referred to in section 280
as ‘‘the trial court’’ brings about unfair and unconstitutional
consequences for the accused’ (para [2.4]).
In order to determine whether the precedent indeed results in
injustice and unconstitutionality by constraining or curbing the
power of the court which puts the suspended sentence into
operation, Judge Murray, writing for the majority of the Free State
High Court, Bloemfontein, found it imperative to first examine the
origin, interpretation and present application of section 280 of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, in view of the Constitution and
also in terms of its interaction with other provisions of theAct such
as sections 297 and 275 (paras [4.1]-[6.11]).
The purpose of section 280 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of
1977 is to prevent a too severe cumulative effect where more than
one sentence is imposed (para [4.1]). The precedent that only the
‘trial court’ has jurisdiction to order concurrency has its origin in
S v Strydom 1967 (2) SA 386 (N) where it was held that ‘this court
in that sub-section is without doubt the court referred to in
sub-section (1), that is to say, the trial court passing sentence at
the conclusion of the trial’ (387C–F of the Strydom case and as
quoted in the case under discussion para [4.5]). Thus, the ‘trial
court’ has since been interpreted as the court convicting the
accused of breaching the suspended conditions and only that
court is competent to order the concurrent running of its own
sentence with the earlier suspended sentence that has been
brought into operation and not vice versa (para [4.6]).
However, Judge Murray did not agree with this interpretation of
the Strydom case. A careful reading of the case and its context
reveals that what Judge Caney actually indicated was that there
are two competent courts which may order concurrency in terms
of section 280(2), namely the court a quo which originally
imposed the suspended sentence, and the court(s) convicting
and sentencing the accused for the breach of the suspended
condition. But each of these competent courts can only order the
concurrent running of its own sentence with that of the previous
court’s sentence and not vice versa. Therefore, the court bringing
the suspended sentence into operation is not competent to make
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a concurrency order in respect of the sentence first imposed
(para [4.11]).
The function of section 297 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of
1977 is to assist a court in imposing a proportional sentence in
cases where a court tries an accused for an offence which
amounts to a breach of the suspensive condition (para [6.2]; also
see S v Breytenbach 1988 (4) SA 286 (TPD) and S v Hoffman
1992 (2) SACR 56 (C)). However, if the sentence is put into
operation by a court which does not have the necessary jurisdic-
tion, an irregularity is committed (para [6.7]). However, Judge
Murray held the view that if the original sentencing court which
imposed the suspended sentence were allowed to give direc-
tions or to impose conditions on how the sentence was to
be brought into operation in future, ‘it would certainly fetter
the sentencing direction of the court that needs to consider the
cumulative effect of the multiple sentences, whether that be
the ‘‘trial court’’ which sentences the accused for breaching the
suspensive condition, or the court which now, some time after the
suspended sentence was imposed, needs to put it into operation
after conducting a full judicial enquiry into the current circum-
stances of the accused’ (para [6.9]).
The court therefore agreed with the magistrate who had
submitted this matter for special review: ‘Section 297(9) triggers
the circumstances described in section 280(1) and that the
provisions of section 297 provides the enforcing court with the
same jurisdiction as the section 280(1) court to impose a compe-
tent punishment in the appropriate circumstances . . . ‘‘the court’’
in section 280(2) therefore refers not only to the ‘‘trial court’’ which
imposes the triggering sentence, but also to the court which
subsequently puts the suspended sentence into operation if the
trial court failed to apply section 280(2)’ (para [6.11]).
Finally, with regard to the principles which a trial court must
apply after conviction and in imposing a just sentence that brings
into operation a suspended sentence, it was held that the
process is similar to that applied during section 297 proceedings,
and that it requires the following factors to be taken into consider-
ation (para [7.1]): first, the court hearing the application for
putting a suspended sentence into operation has a discretion
and is not bound upon a breach of the conditions of suspension
to grant the application (para [7.3]; also see S v Peskin 1997 (2)
SACR 460 (C)); the reasonableness of the suspended sentence
as well as the condition of suspension must also be taken into
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consideration (para [7.4]); and the circumstances of the offence
committed in breach of the conditions of suspension and the
purpose of suspending a sentence, ie to serve as a deterrent for
similar future criminal behaviour and an incentive for rehabilita-
tion must be considered, especially if it appears that additional
punishment would no longer serve a rehabilitative or deterrent
purpose (para [7.5]). Further, before such a suspended sentence
is put into operation, the person concerned must be afforded an
opportunity to address the court and to lead evidence (para
[7.9]).
With regard to the interaction between sections 280, 297 and
275 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, it was held that
‘whichever court is the last one to apply its sentencing discretion,
needs to keep the ‘‘cumulative effect’’ or ‘‘totality principle’’ in
mind, for unless concurrency is ordered, the formerly suspended
sentence will be tagged onto the end of the triggering sentence
and may result in disproportionate punishment. For that reason
. . . ‘‘the court’’ in section 280 needs to include an enforcing court
(section 297) and a substituting court (section 275)’ (paras [7.18]
[9.10]).
Also see S v Jwara (A841/2015) [2015] ZAGPPHC 890
(12 November 2015) where it was held that it is competent for a
court to direct that a sentence of imprisonment without the option
of a fine run concurrently with a sentence of a fine with alternative
imprisonment in terms of section 280(2) of the Criminal Procedure
Act 51 of 1977 (para [6]).
PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS
In Thorne v S (5/1595/2015) [2015] ZAWCHC 52 (23 April
2015), the question of the consideration of previous convictions in
deciding on an appropriate sentence was considered. The
accused in this case, a 42-year-old male, was convicted on a
charge of theft after he pleaded guilty to stealing seven blocks
of cheese valued at R287,75 from a local supermarket (para [1]).
After the prosecutor presented the court with a list of previous
convictions against the accused, and the accused had been
given the opportunity to address the court, the magistrate contin-
ued to sentence the accused to a period of twelve months’
imprisonment and an additional twelve months’ imprisonment
suspended for a period of five years on condition that the
accused is not again convicted of theft or attempted theft during
the period of suspension (para [1]).
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On automatic review before Judge Henney of the Western
Cape High Court, Cape Town, this sentence was found to be
disproportionate. First, in considering the list of previous convic-
tions of the accused, it was evident that the first two convictions,
which were also on counts of theft, were respectively imposed
seventeen and eighteen years before this most recent conviction.
Thereafter, a period of fourteen years lapsed before the accused
was convicted of an unrelated offence, namely possession of
drugs (para [7]). This was followed by three further unrelated
convictions, two convictions for contempt of court as the accused
failed to appear in court, and one conviction for contravening
section 17 of the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 (para [8]).
The last conviction, which was in December 2014, was again for
the crime of theft (para [9]).
In addition to the observance of the time lapses between the
various convictions, as well as the highlighting of the convictions
for unrelated offences, Judge Henney also noted that, in terms of
section 271A of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, the first
two convictions of theft had already lapsed for the purpose of
considering them as previous convictions for sentencing (paras
[9] [10]). The reason was that the previous convictions for the
thefts committed in 1996 and 1997 automatically lapsed after a
period of ten years in terms of section 271A, and the accused
was not convicted of another offence during this period ‘in
respect of which a sentence of imprisonment for a period
exceeding six months without the option of a fine was imposed’
(para [10]).
PAROLE
Parole is an administrative function governed by the Correc-
tional Services Act 111 of 1998. In essence it entails the release
on probation or parole of a sentenced prisoner, normally subject
to certain conditions. The Act provides for the relevant oversight
and structures, including the important role of the Parole Board.
The cases below illustrate the grounds upon which applicants
can take decisions by the Commissioner of Correctional Ser-
vices, the Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and other
role-players on review.
Placement on parole
The applicant in Van der Merwe v Minister of Justice and
Correctional Services & others (89493/2015) [2015] ZAGPPHC
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828 (9 December 2015) was sentenced to death, a sentence that
was commuted to life imprisonment in 1986 (para [2]). When the
urgent application for his release on parole, or alternatively on
day parole, was heard before the North Gauteng High Court,
Pretoria, the applicant had been imprisoned for more than 30
years, as he had been arrested for the offences committed on
31 August 1985 (para [2]). With this application, the applicant
applied for the decision of the Minister of Justice and Correctional
Services to be reviewed and set aside, denying that he be placed
on parole or day parole, despite contrary recommendations
made by the Parole Board and the Case Management Committee
of the Correctional Centre where he was being held (paras [1]
[3]).
From the record it emerged that the Minister of Justice and
Correctional Services, in making his decision, took into consider-
ation, inter alia, two affidavits made by family members of the
applicant, and which placed on record that the applicant had
threatened them. These two affidavits were, however, never
placed before the Parole Board or the Case Management Com-
mittee to consider, nor was the applicant afforded an opportunity
to respond to the allegations they contained (para [4]). Moreover,
the Parole Board and the Case Management Committee were
never asked by the Minister whether they had consulted with the
victims of the applicant’s crimes, although this was offered as one
of the reasons for not granting him parole (paras [4]-[7]).
In considering the history of the applicant’s case which showed
that the Parole Board and the Case Management Committee had
previously also recommended the applicant for parole and that
the Minister, in each of these instances, also did not take on
board their recommendations, Judge Pretorius of the North
Gauteng High Court, Pretoria, concluded that ‘it seems as if the
applicant is doomed to a life in prison’ (para [11]). Judge
Pretorius highlighted that the applicant had been a model
prisoner for 30 years ‘with no blemishes on his record and [that
he] became eligible for parole for the first time in 1996. However,
he was only considered and recommended . . . 10 years after he
had become eligible . . .’ (para [12]). It was ultimately concluded
that the applicant had not been treated fairly and that ‘drastic
measures’ needed to be implemented in order to ‘rectify the
present situation urgently’ (para [34]). It was, therefore, con-
cluded that the necessary arrangements be made for the appli-
cant to appear before the Parole Board, that all relevant facts be
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placed before the Parole Board, and that the Board’s recommen-
dation be passed to the Minister who must make a decision
based on the Parole Board’s recommendation before 22 January
2016 (para [35]).
Placement on medical parole
Section 79(1)(a)-(c) of the Correctional Services Act 111 of
1998 provides for a sentenced offender to be considered for
placement on medical parole if that offender is ‘suffering from a
terminal disease or condition or if such offender is rendered
physically incapacitated as a result of injury, disease or illness so
as to severely limit daily activity or inmate self-care’ (Derby-Lewis
v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services 2015 (2) SACR
412 (GP) (29 May 2015) para [7]). Two further requirements are
set in that there must be a low risk of re-offending and that
appropriate arrangements for the inmate’s supervision, care and
treatment must have been made within the community to which
he or she is to be released (para [7]). The procedure for such an
application for placement on medical parole is set out in the
remainder of section 79 and its accompanying regulations. First,
it is required that an application for medical parole be supported
by a written medical report as well as an independent medical
report in terms of section 79(3) of the Act (para [8]). The Medical
Parole Advisory Board (MPAB) must then make a determination
based on these medical reports, and by taking a number of
factors and criteria into consideration. In terms of sections 79(5)
and 42(2)(d) of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 the
MPAB is tasked to consider, inter alia, whether at the time of
sentencing the presiding officer was aware of the medical
condition for which medical parole is sought etc (para [9]).
Regulation 29A(5) furthermore provides for criteria that the MPAB
must consider in assessing whether the offender is suffering from
a terminal disease or condition as set out in section 79(1)(a) of the
Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 (para [11]). With regard to
cancer, the medical condition from which the applicant in this
case was suffering, Regulation 29A(5)(b)(i) specifically requires
that it must be a ‘[m]alignant cancer stage IV with metastasis
being inoperable or with both radiotherapy and chemotherapy
failure’ (para [12]). (It is, however, in terms of Regulation 29A(6)
also possible for the MPAB to consider other conditions not listed
in Regulation 29A(5) (para [13]).) Once the MPAB has made a
determination, it must make a recommendation to the Minister of
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Justice and Correctional Services as to the appropriateness to
allow for the applicant to be released on medical parole in
accordance with section 79(1)(a) of the Act. The Minister, in turn,
must consider a positive recommendation in terms of the condi-
tions as stipulated in section 79(1)(b) and (c) and as was
described above (para [14]).
The applicant in Derby-Lewis v Minister of Justice and Correc-
tional Services 2015 (2) SACR 412 (GP) (29 May 2015) applied
for an order placing him on medical parole in terms of section 79
of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 (paras [2.2] [6]).
According to the medical reports submitted, the applicant was
suffering from lung cancer, heart failure, and hypertension (para
[17]). The medical reports further indicated that the applicant’s
cancer was inoperable, and that there was no distal spread or
metastasis. The MPAB also confirmed that while the applicant
was receiving both chemotherapy and radiotherapy, he was
‘clinically well and [still] able to perform his daily activities and
inmate self-care’. It was further submitted that with regard to the
staging of cancers, the applicant’s illness was categorised as
stage IIIB, and therefore did not satisfy the criteria as stipulated in
the Act and as described above (para [18]). However, reports
submitted by two independent medical specialists came to a
different conclusion (paras [22]-[24]). The independent medical
specialists diagnosed the applicant as suffering from stage IV
cancer on the basis that the cancer had spread to his left adrenal
gland (para [24]). In view of this difference in medical opinion, the
MPAB recommended to the Minister that the applicant be placed
on medical parole as his cancer could be staged at least at stage
IIIB with a probable but inconclusive spread to the left adrenal
gland (para [26]).
The Minister, however, decided not to approve the recommen-
dation of the MPAB for the placement of the applicant on medical
parole (para [27]). The Minister based this decision on the fact
that it was not conclusive that the applicant’s cancer had indeed
reached stage IV, the applicant was not found to be physically
incapacitated so as to severely limit his daily activity or self-care,
and there was no indication that the applicant showed any
remorse for the crimes he had committed (para [28]).
In reviewing this decision, Judge Baqwa of the North Gauteng
High Court, Pretoria, emphasised that the applicant had never
been given access to, nor given an opportunity to respond to all
the information the MPAB had in its possession and on which it
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had based its findings and recommendation (para [37]). This was
particularly unfair as it was also clear from the reasons given by
the Minister for his decision, that he had also taken all this
information into account when reaching his decision (para [37]).
This, it was held, falls foul of section 6(2)(b) of the Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act (PAJA) 3 of 2000 which empowers a
court or tribunal to judicially review the administrative action of
the Minister on the ground that a mandatory and material
procedure or condition prescribed by an empowering provision
had not been complied with (paras [41] [42]). This principle
of audi alteram partem was furthermore held as a basic tenet of
South African law that exists over and above the provisions of the
PAJA (para [42]).
This flawed nature of the process, according to Judge Baqwa,
could not be cured and in considering what relief would be
appropriate given the circumstances — which included a very
poor prognosis of only six months to live by the two independent
medical specialists — it was held that the applicant be placed on
medical parole (paras [45] [63]). Further delay, it was held, would
cause ‘unjustifiable prejudice to the applicant whose life is
already precariously poised according to the medical evidence
presented in this application’ (para [60]). The conditions under
which the applicant was to be released were left to the Minister
and the MPAB to decide (para [64]). More generally, with regard
to the interpretation of the provisions of section 79 of the Correc-
tional Services Act 111 of 1998, it was held that the ‘provisions
ought not to be applied in a rigid manner or be read like a
mathematical equations’ (para [58]).
Also see Paddock v Correctional Medical Practitioner, St
Albans Medium B Correctional Centre & others 2015 (1) SACR
200 (ECP).
Anon-parole period in terms of section 276B(1) of the Criminal Procedure
Act 51 of 1977
In Strydom v S (20215/14) [2014] ZASCA 29 (23 March 2015),
the appellant was sentenced to a term of five years’ imprisonment
upon a conviction on 36 charges of fraud (para [1]). The
presiding officer of the Gauteng Regional Court (Specialised
Commercial Crime Court) further ordered that the appellant serve
at least three years of her five-year term before being placed on
or before being considered eligible for placement on parole (para
[1]). This proviso was made in terms of section 276B of the
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Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 which allows for a court to fix a
period during which a convicted offender shall not be placed on
parole, where that court has sentenced that offender to a term of
imprisonment for a period of two years or longer. This fixed
non-parole period may further not exceed two-thirds of the term
of imprisonment or a period of 25 years, whichever is shorter
(para [10]).
From the record it transpired, however, that the appellant was
not provided with an opportunity to address the court when the
magistrate invoked section 276B of the Criminal Procedure Act
51 of 1977, and the magistrate also did not give any reasons for
his decision in this regard (para [11]). This failure to afford the
appellant an opportunity to address the court before fixing a
non-parole period, and the failure of the magistrate to provide
reasons for invoking section 276B of the Criminal Procedure Act
51 of 1977, were found to constitute a misdirection (para [11]). In
Stander v S 2012 (1) SACR 537 (SCA), it was held that section
276B of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 should only be
invoked when the circumstances of the particular case so warrant
(para [20] of the Stander case). Factors that a court should take
into consideration in this regard include the particular circum-
stances of the case, and, as it relates to parole specifically, any
aggravating factors pertaining to the commission of the crime. A
proper evidential basis must furthermore be laid for a finding that
such circumstances exist so as to justify the imposition of a fixed
non-parole period (para [15], referring to para [20] of the Stander
case). Judge Pillay writing for the majority of the Supreme Court
of Appeal, added that ‘[s]uch an order should only be made in
exceptional circumstances which can only be established by
investigation and a consideration of salient facts, legal argument
and perhaps further evidence upon which such a decision rests’
(para [16]; also see Mthimkulu v S 2012 (2) SACR 89 (SCA)).
Also see Selli v S (220/15) [2015] ZASCA 173 (26 November
2015).
Cause of action for damages upon re-arrest and detention after being
placed on parole erroneously
The question in Bhalithafa v Minister of Correctional Services
(1166/2013) [2015] ZAECMHC 46 (9 April 2015) was whether a
person serving a sentence in prison has a cause of action for
damages if he is re-arrested without a warrant or a court order
consequent upon his erroneous release on parole (para [1]).
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The plaintiff in this case was serving an effective term of 25
years’ imprisonment for culpable homicide and murder (para [2]).
While still serving his term of imprisonment, the Correctional
Services Parole Board considered him for placement on parole.
This decision was provisional and subject to the outcome of a
restorative justice programme which entailed, inter alia, that the
victims of his crimes be informed of his release on parole (para
[3]). Unfortunately, the restorative justice component of the parole
decision was never complied with and the plaintiff was errone-
ously released on parole (para [4]). Upon a complaint launched
by the victims of the crimes committed by the plaintiff, the Board
cancelled the plaintiff’s parole and he was re-arrested and
detained until a later date when he was properly released on
parole (para [4]). The plaintiff now claimed damages for his
alleged wrongful arrest founded on the absence of a warrant or
court order justifying his arrest (para [5]).
Since the plaintiff commenced serving his sentence of 25
years’ imprisonment on 9 April 2003, the provisions of the
Correctional Services Act 8 of 1959 applied to his release on
parole and sections 63 and 65 of this Act specifically require that
a Parole Board first submit its recommendations to the Commis-
sioner of Correctional Services or the Minister and only once the
Commissioner or the Minister had approved the report and
recommendations, could the prisoner be released on parole.
Moreover, the provisional release of a prisoner subject to compli-
ance with a restorative justice programme is not provided for in
terms of the 1959 Act and its regulations (para [8]). It was
consequently found that the plaintiff in this matter had not been
lawfully released in terms of the legislative framework applicable
to his sentence and possible release on parole, and that he was
therefore ‘not a free man’ until he had finished serving his
sentence. His re-arrest to continue serving his sentence until he
was properly released on parole was therefore found to be in
accordance with the provisions of the 1959 Act and its regula-
tions (para [9]; compare with Kommissaris van Korrektiewe
Dienste v Malaza 1996 (1) SA 1143 (WPA)). For this reason, it was
held that the plaintiff’s re-arrest could not be construed as illegal
and that he had no viable claim for damages (para [11]).
Invoking parole already granted
The applicant in Du Preez v Minister of Justice and Correctional
Services 2015 (1) SACR 478 (GP) was convicted of murder and
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sentenced on 18 January 2005 to twelve years’ imprisonment
(para [3]). On 27 January 2014, the Correctional Supervision and
Parole Board of the Kgosi Mampuru II Prison approved the
applicant’s release on parole. However, only five days after his
release, information was published in the media relating to the
illegal activities of the applicant whilst he had been incarcerated.
It came to light that the applicant had smuggled alcohol into the
prison and held a party in his cell shortly before he was to be
released on parole (para [4]). As a result, the applicant was
re-arrested in terms of section 70(1)(a)(ii) of the Correctional
Services Act 111 of 1998 and his parole revoked for a period of
one year (para [5]).
The applicant thereafter sought a declaratory order declaring,
inter alia, that the second respondent had no jurisdiction to
revoke his parole and that the applicant was to be released from
incarceration and his parole conditions be re-established (para
[1]). The applicant argued that his conduct in prison did not
amount to a violation of his parole conditions and was not
covered by section 70 of the Correctional Services Act 111 of
1998. Section 70 deals only with breaches of parole conditions of
offenders who have been released on parole and are outside the
confines of prison. The applicant argued that his conduct in
prison amounted only to a disciplinary violation, the sanction for
which was not covered by section 70 of the Act (para [7]).
On the question of whether the applicant’s parole could be
revoked for transgressions committed whilst in incarceration and
prior to his release on parole, Justice Mavundla of the North
Gauteng High Court, Pretoria, held that the applicant, despite
being on parole, remained a sentenced prisoner and had no right
to parole and consequently no right to resist its revocation (para
[9]). It was further held that the National Commissioner had a
wide discretion to decide when to grant parole and also to decide
when to revoke it. In exercising this discretion, the National
Commissioner may take into consideration any factor which
comes to his attention, including ‘past conduct of the parolee,
brought to light subsequent to his release from incarceration’
(para [9]). Given the nature and gravity of the applicant’s
transgressions and conduct, Justice Mavundla ultimately held
that it was proper and just not to interfere with the decision of the
National Commissioner to have the applicant’s parole revoked
(para [15]).
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RECONSIDERATION OF THE SENTENCE OF A DECLARED DANGEROUS
CRIMINAL IN TERMS OF SECTION 286 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
ACT 51 OF 1977
The accused in S v Bashford (CC54/94) [2015] ZAGPPHC 146
(13 March 2015) was convicted of murder and theft and after
relevant evidence had been presented, including an enquiry and
unanimous finding by a team of psychiatrists, he was declared a
dangerous criminal in terms of section 286A of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (paras [1] [2]). This declaration was
made on the basis that the accused showed anti-social personality
traits, that he represented a danger to the physical or mental
well-being of other persons, and that there was a need for the
community to be protected against him (para [2]). Following this
declaration, the accused was sentenced to undergo an indefinite
period of imprisonment subject to a direction that he be brought
before the court on a later specified date (para [2]).
In terms of section 286B(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of
1977, a court has three options when a prisoner, who has been
declared a dangerous criminal and who has been imprisoned for
an indefinite period subject to a return date, is brought for a
reconsideration of the sentence: the court may confirm the
sentence for an indefinite period and set another return date; it
may convert the sentence into correctional supervision; or it may
order the release of the prisoner unconditionally or on such
conditions as it deems fit (para [4]).
The correct approach in reconsidering such a sentence is also
based on the ‘Zinn-triad’ as set out in S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A)
where it was found that if there is no merit in extending the
prisoner’s indefinite sentence, regard must be had to the serious-
ness of the crimes and other relevant factors including his or her
conduct whilst in prison, mental state, possible rehabilitation
as well as relapse into crime, and any training or other programmes
completed (para [13]).
A SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT WHOLLY SUSPENDED AND SECTION
85(1) OF THE CHILD JUSTICE ACT 75 OF 2008
The accused in S v Singana (CA&R 54/2015) [2015]
ZAECPEHC 9 (4 March 2015) was seventeen years old when he
committed the offences of housebreaking with the intent to steal
and theft (para [4]). He was duly convicted in the magistrate’s
court and sentenced by the Regional Court to 24 months’
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imprisonment wholly suspended for five years on condition that
he is not convicted of ‘housebreaking with the intent to steal and
theft or theft during the period of suspension’. The accused was
also sentenced to a further 24 months’ correctional supervision,
subject to specific conditions as set out by the sentencing court
(para [3]). Confusion ensued, however, as to whether this matter
was subject to automatic review in terms of section 85 of the Child
Justice Act 75 of 2008.
Section 85(1) of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 was amended
by the Judicial Matters Amendment Act 42 of 2013 and now
provides that where a child has been sentenced to any form of
imprisonment or any sentence of compulsory residence in a child
and youth care centre providing a programme as set out in
section 191(2)(j) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, that the
sentence is subject to review in terms of section 304 of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. Section 302 of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 governs automatic review and section
302(1)(a)(i) specifically states that where a child has been
sentenced to any form of imprisonment or any sentence of
compulsory residence in a child and youth care centre providing
a programme as set out in section 191(2)(j) of the Children’s Act
38 of 2005 and such term exceeds a period of three months, and
was imposed by a judicial officer who has not held the substan-
tive rank of magistrate or higher for a period of seven years, or the
term exceeds a period of six months and was imposed by a
judicial officer who has held a substantive rank of magistrate or
higher for a period of seven years or longer, that such a sentence
shall be subject to review by a judge of the provincial or local
division having jurisdiction (para [8]).
Thus, the amended section 85(1) extends the protection of
automatic review to children by providing for a qualified right to
automatic review as explained above (para [9]). Judge Majiki of
the Eastern Cape High Court, Port Elizabeth, held that this
expanded protection also extends to a sentence of imprisonment
that was wholly suspended (paras [11]-[14]; also see Jaga v
Donges NO & another; Bhana v Donges NO & another 1950 (4)
SA SA 653 (A)).
PRISONERS’ RIGHTS
In Tshikane v Minister of Correctional Services & others 2015
(2) SACR 99 (GJ) the rights of prisoners being transferred from
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one prison to another in terms of section 43 of the Correctional
Services Act 111 of 1998 was considered.
Section 43 of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998
provides that a sentenced prisoner must be housed at the prison
closest to the place where he or she is to reside after release but
with due regard to the availability of accommodation and facilities
to meet the prisoner’s security requirements. Provision is also
made for the transfer of sentenced prisoners from one prison to
another, and Regulation 25 under Chapter III of the Act provides
that the reason for the proposed transfer must be conveyed to the
prisoner to enable him or her to make representations in this
regard. These representations must be recorded in writing.
However, where the transfer is for security reasons, the prisoner
need not be informed of the proposed transfer but must be given
reasons for the transfer as soon as practicable thereafter (para
[5]).
In emphasising section 35(2) of the Constitution — which
provides for the rights of detainees, including sentenced prison-
ers — Justice Moshidi of the South Gauteng High Court, Johan-
nesburg, also pointed out that the transfer of prisoners is a
discretionary matter that is dependent on a number of factors and
conditions (para [10]; also see Minister of Correctional Services v
Kwakwa [2002] 2 All SA 242 (A), 2002 (4) SA 455 (SCA)). Yet, in
this case the applicant was not notified of the proposed transfer,
was not given the opportunity to make representations, and it was
also evident that he was not transferred for security reasons but
because of overcrowding in the Johannesburg Medium B Prison
(para [10]). Moreover, the residuum principle clearly requires that
prisoners be housed nearest to their domicilium (para [10]). It
was also emphasised that urgent applications from prisoners
contesting their transfers to other prisons are being brought with
increasing frequency and that the guiding principles as set out in
the legislation and regulations thereto must be followed to ensure
that prisoners’ rights are protected (para [15]).
WHEN DOES THE QUESTION OF REMORSE ARISE AS A FACTOR IN
SENTENCING?
The appellants in Magingxa & others v S (CA&R401/2014)
[2015] ZAECGHC 104 (25 September 2015) were convicted of
murder and each sentenced to life imprisonment (para [1]). On
appeal against both conviction and sentence, Judge Goosen of
the Eastern Cape High Court, Grahamstown, emphasised that
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‘[a]n accused person, even once convicted by a trial court,
retains the right not to incriminate him or herself and is not
obliged to admit any facts relevant to the conviction during the
stage of sentencing’ (para [29]). Thus, where an accused has
maintained his or her innocence throughout the trial, any per-
ceived ‘failure’ of that accused to take responsibility for the
offence(s) and to express remorse during the sentencing stage
cannot be considered an aggravating factor for the purpose of
sentencing (para [29]).
The question of remorse as a factor in sentencing, it was held,
only arises ‘if the accused asserts an apology and therefore
either expressly or inherently concedes involvement in the com-
mission of the offence. When such positive expression of an
apology is made, or when it is asserted that the inference must be
drawn from other facts that there exists remorse, then (and only
then) will the court evaluate it as a factor for the purpose of
sentencing’ (para [30]; also see S v Matyityi 2011 (1) SACR 40
(SCA) for the principles enunciated in this regard).
Also see S v Mooketsi & another 2015 (1) SACR 295 (NCK),
where the appellants were so struck with remorse on the evening
of having participated in taking money destined for automatic
teller machines, hiding it, and pretending that they had been
robbed, that they immediately confessed, and handed over the
money on the following day. In this case, it was held that ‘there
was no doubt that the appellants were sincerely remorseful’ (para
[20]).
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